Did
the deployment of embedded reporters give the public a more accurate
picture of events during the most recent Iraq conflict, or was it simply
a ploy by the military to control the output of the media?
Introduction
In this report I will be looking at the role of embedded journalists
in the most recent Iraq conflict and the whether they provided an accurate
picture of what was going on during the war.
I will do this first
of all by comparing the role of the embedded reporter with that of unilateral
and pool reporters. I will examine the pressures and expectations placed
upon journalists in each role.
I will also be looking
at the issue from the point of view of the coalition governments and
the military who promoted the use of embeds. I will look at the rules
they imposed and discuss the concerns that arose from their approach.
I will look at the
various advantages and disadvantages of using embedded reporters from
the point of view of the journalist, the news organisation and the viewer
or reader back at home and discuss the issues of impartiality and objectivity
in reporting.
Finally I will investigate
the various types of censorship imposed on the reports of embeds by
the military, media organisations and the self-censorship that journalists
imposed on themselves.
For my research
I attended a public debate hosted by Mediactive and Reporting the World,
entitled Mediawar, held on November 24, 2004. Speakers included Roger
Mosey, BBC Head of Television News, Jake Lynch, Director of journalism
thinktank, Reporting the World, and Jim Maceda, an NBC correspondent
I will also be drawing
from comments made at the Royal Television Society lecture on December
9, 2003 by Geraint Vincent, a reporter embedded with the British Paratroop
Regiment, and Rob Bowles, a multi-skilled camera operator and video
editor who travelled with US troops. My notes from both discussions
are included in the appendix.
I will also use transcripts
taken from a previous Reporting the World event, Reporting Iraq –
What went right, what went wrong?, held on July 15, 2003 (appendix
3).
Embeds,
unilaterals and the pool system
The recent Iraq war saw a huge increase in the use of embedded reporters
– journalists assigned to a military unit. Although reporters
have travelled with the military before (Cardiff, 2004), the scale of
the embed project was unprecedented, with some reports claiming that
at the height of the war up to 800 journalists were placed with regiments
across Iraq. This new approach meant that the media could get closer
than ever before to the action of the conflict.
Embedded reporting
has received much criticism compared to the work of independent journalists.
However, during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, broadcast media tended
to rely almost entirely on information from press pools. For that reason
a comparison between unilateral reporters and embedded reporters seems
unfair. However, the most recent Iraq conflict has demonstrated that
unilateral reporters have found themselves in increasing danger. Since
the start of the 2003 Iraq war 27 western journalists had been killed
in the space of a year (www.cpj.org,
2004).
In previous conflicts
such as the Gulf War, reporters were normally confined to press pools,
relying on military briefings for information. This approach was also
a feature in the more recent Iraq conflict although the introduction
of embedded reporting added a further dimension to the information that
was available.
Jon Swain, a reporter
in the Gulf War, said that during the conflict US armed forces restricted
the movements of journalists, citing security and safety concerns. The
military was concerned that roaming journalists may pose a security
threat by inadvertently disclosing army positions or other tactical
secrets through their reports. They also claimed that journalists, who
were clearly not militarily-minded, would pose a safety threat, both
to themselves and the soldiers they were accompanying.
This pool approach
to dealing with the media was extremely restricting as journalists were
afforded little freedom. Although the reports they sent back weren’t
censored, the information they received was heavily filtered.
“Correspondents,
with rare exception, got much of their news at daily briefings. Last
year in Afghanistan, the Royal Marines bottled up journalists in the
heat and dust of Bagram airbase, taking them on pools of limited value.”
Swain (2003)
The
obvious problem with the pool system of journalists was that it was
very easy for the military to dictate the news agenda and feed them
propaganda. As Jake Lynch (appendix
1) points out, propaganda does not necessarily mean deception,
however, in a pool situation, with the military understandably intent
on promoting their aims, information is filtered to the extent that
very little of the full picture is likely to remain. Journalists confined
to a base or hotels are unable to verify the facts that they are given
or shoot footage of the events that they are reporting. Journalists
who broke the rules by striking out on their own were routinely detained
and usually deported.
Swain adds:
“The
American military was ruthless with any journalist it caught acting
independently of the pool, rounding them up and sending them all the
way back to the JIB, the joint information bureau, hundreds of miles
at the rear of Dhahran. They went so far as to try and get the Saudi
authorities to throw several offenders out of the country.”
In the case of embedded
reporting, these problems are partially resolved as reporters witness
first hand the actions of the troops. But although they are out on the
battlefield their movements are still confined and their experience
is one that is shared with their unit.
A similar situation
to the pool system was in place during the 2003 Iraq war when journalists
were holed-up in the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad. According to Jim Maceda,
a correspondent for NBC, the journalists were reliant on official briefings
throughout this period. Their role as broadcast journalists was also
very limiting because they were timetabled to produce live reports for
regular bulletins back in the UK and US. This, according to Maceda,
made it virtually impossible to report very much of what was going on
because reporters were “chained to the satellite dish” (appendix
1).
The nature of news broadcasting meant that it was imperative to get
live footage every hour – even if it was just of the reporter
standing on the roof in Baghdad – to feed the demand for 24 hour
news channels at home. This was restricting because the importance of
transmitting a live report was usually placed above the process of newsgathering
and the verbal content of the transmission.
The sheer number
of embedded journalists in Iraq meant an array of footage was available
to broadcasters. Geraint Vincent, who was embedded with the paras, prepared
reports for a number of channels including CNN and ITV. Improved technology
such as laptops and satellite phones enabled him to send packages back
to London from his position on the battlefield (appendix
2).
Another alternative
to embedded reporting is what has become known as the ‘unilateral’
reporter, journalists who travel independently of military units and
are offered no protection by the armed forces. The benefit of this style
of reporting is that a more balanced picture can be obtained about events.
Inevitably, a journalist embedded with a British army division is unlikely
to obtain a human interest story about the suffering of ordinary Iraqi
people, whereas an independent reporter is technically free to investigate
any aspect of the conflict.
Although independent
reporters existed during the Iraq conflict, they operated under extremely
dangerous conditions and many were killed. A debate continues about
the reasons for the high number of fatalities to media professionals.
I will discuss this in the next chapter.
Why
embed? The official line
The massive exercise undertaken by coalition forces to embed journalists
was seen by some camps as a new way of controlling the media (Byrne,
2003). The US government and the military were keen to stress that there
would be no censorship of news and the embedding process meant that
more journalists were able to report from the front line, producing
first hand reports about daily events.
Victoria Clarke,
assistant secretary of defence for public affairs and chief spokesperson
at the Pentagon said:
“If
you’ve followed the Pentagon for some time, you know we’ve
tried and Secretary Rumsfeld has tried since the very beginning to
be very transparent in our business… We knew the more people
saw the US military, the more they would understand the mission.”
(Cited
in Tumber & Palmer, 2004, p.13)
The US saw embedding
as a PR opportunity. They repeatedly referred to embeds as ‘independent
journalists’ who would have the opportunity to report on events
whether they were good or bad. Bryan Whitman, deputy assistance secretary
for public affairs at the Pentagon, said that embedding was one of the
principal means of coverage of the Iraq conflict, however he also acknowledged
that:
“Because
it is very deep, rich coverage… it’s not very broad.”
(Cited in Tumber & Palmer, 2004, p.14)
Prior to the Iraq
invasion the Pentagon also warned media organisations that if their
reporters were not embedded they could risk being fired upon (CNN, 2003).
Richard Sambrook, BBC’s head of news said:
“The
fact is that we were inhibited from being able to work independently
to the extent that we would have liked, and that definitely had an
impact on the journalism on the overview we were able to present.”
As the
conflict progressed, increasing numbers of reports implied that the
US had deliberately targeted the independent media (Knightley, 2003
and Tryhorn, 2003). Up until May 2004, some 27 western journalists had
been killed in Iraq since the beginning of the conflict (www.cpj.org,
2004), a sizeable number were the victims of ‘friendly fire’,
all were independent reporters.
The military argued
that embedding reporters would enable them closer access to events but
would also help protect the lives of both the media and the soldiers
on the battlefield.
Tony Pawson, the
MoD's director general said:
"The
coverage which was given by the embeds could not have been obtained
in any other way and it did add significantly and valuably to the
overall picture we were seeing."
(BBC News, 2003)
However, critics
including the European Broadcasting Union argued that the system meant
independent reporters were frozen out by the military as a kind of punishment
for not toeing the line (Byrne, 2003).
The ability of freelance
journalists to report on the war was also restricted because embed places
were allocated to news organisations and not to individual reporters.
This made it difficult for freelancers to get in on the action; however
it enabled the US Department of Defense to keep tabs on how the media
reported the war (Tumber & Palmer, 2004).
The process of embedding
journalists on the most part began with a rigorous training programme
and reporters went on to spend months with one group of soldiers. For
the military and coalition governments, this also had other benefits
other than a PR exercise. Since national service ended in the coalition
countries there have been fewer reporters with any specialist or detailed
knowledge about the military. The embedding exercise would change that
trend. It would also create a more trusting relationship between the
generals and the media, especially after the problems in Vietnam, when
the media was widely blamed for the loss of public support for the war.
Impartiality
and objectivity
Embedded reporting has come under criticism for a number of reasons.
BBC reporter John Simpson declined to be embedded because he felt it
would compromise his professional ability to be impartial and objective.
“Mr
Simpson, one of those journalists who covered the war without being
‘embedded’ said he had felt working from within a military
unit would have compromised his journalism. He told BBC Radio 4's
Today: "I didn't want to be part of it because I didn't want
to be dependent on the people I was reporting on for my security,
my food, my transport. We need to have independent journalists moving
around."”
(BBC News Online, 12 November, 2003)
Inevitably if a journalist
is relying on a regiment for his or her survival it will become very
difficult to criticise the actions of those troops, especially if any
reports sent are being vetted before they are transmitted. Furthermore,
if a reporter is living, breathing and sleeping alongside a particular
group, then that group’s opinions will be the only views heard
by the embed. It is natural that the reports will be one sided. With
a lack of an opposing argument it is very easy to slip into the mindset
of your companions. This makes impartiality very difficult.
There was noticeably
very few Iraqis in the embed reports. The only opportunity to film or
report upon Iraqi civilians was when they were welcoming troops, as
was the case in much of southern Iraq where resistance to the coalition
was relatively weak. By travelling with the troops access to everyday
human interest stories was very limited.
One Canadian journalist
commented:
“By
keeping ‘unilateral’ journalists out of Iraq, the Americans
have succeeded in reducing independent reporting of the war, and I
believe that was exactly their plan from the beginning. I spoke to
an old man in the town of Safwan after he'd fought through a crowd
to obtain a box of food and water delivered by the Kuwait Red Crescent
Society. He was obviously grateful, but distraught at the site of
foreign soldiers on his land. "We don't want the British, and
we don't want the Americans," he told me. "We don't want
to become another Palestine." You're not getting interviews like
that from embedded reporters; you're more likely to see a glorified
view of American power and morality, in a war that much of the world
considers unnecessary, unjustified or plain wrong, and is being covered
at every crossroads, at every captured bridge by a press corps that's
sleeping with the winner.”
(Workman, 2003)
Because of the daily
cut and thrust of the conflict, reporters on embedded with troops had
little time to reflect or report on the wider issues surrounding the
war; they were only able to comment on the immediate events surrounding
them because, although they were witnessing the stories first-hand,
information about the wider conflict and its implications was limited.
Richard Sambrook, BBC’s head of news said:
“You
get a better flavour but you are now further up the information chain
in the field, so that is why you get the news like Umm Qasr has fallen
and there's an uprising in Basra, because you are hearing from the
military before they have worked out what is happening and you are
live on air telling the world about it before they really know what
is going on… even if we think we can understand the issues it
raises I am quite sure the audience doesn't, which is why you got
people saying, "the BBC says this and it turns out to be wrong".
Well, what we said was what we thought we'd been told at the time,
and if it then turned out to be wrong we had to go back and correct
it.”
The more positive
aspects of embedded reporting mean that journalists can verify for themselves
the validity of claims. They offer a unique first-hand account of the
conflict, free from censorship although not necessarily free from bias.
Journalists are no longer dependent on briefings and get close to the
action as it is happening.
Rob Bowles, an embedded
camera operator with US forces, said the work of independent reporters
offered:
“a
more broad and accurate picture of the chaos brought about by military
action”
This view was reinforced
by Audrey Gillan, a Guardian reporter who was embedded with the Household
Cavalry:
“The
thing about being embedded and the 100-odd people who were embedded
is that we had completely different individual experiences and everything
that we saw was completely different. But the thing that we had in
common was it was a microcosm of the war. My view of the war was out
of back of a very small window that size (hands mark a small rectangle
in the air) in an armed reconnaissance vehicle or in the middle of
the desert... …We maybe saw more stuff but it lacked context.
We certainly lacked context in the sense that we did not know what
was going on in the war and that’s one of the things that we
have to acknowledge about being embedded. We cannot pretend that it
is anything other than the view of where that correspondent is.”
Journalists believed
the reports they sent back were forming part of a jigsaw that would
inform and reinforce more general reports from central command, however
the lack of briefings at central command attracted criticism from the
reporters based there. Sketchy information meant that they were unable
to put the close-up reports of the embeds into any context.
Censorship
Although the coalition stressed that there would be no censorship of
the media, the two embeds that I spoke to suggested that this was not
the case.
Rob Bowles said that
in January and February of 2003 he went to Iraq to report on the weapons
of mass destruction and Iraqi public opinion. However, the news broadcasts
he watched on cable TV from the UK via cable and satellite bore little
resemblance to his own experiences or the reports that he had filed
(appendix
2).
After the war began
he said that there was no censorship and every single package that he
sent back was broadcast uncut. He said: “There was so little coverage
getting through, broadcasters were grateful for any reports they received.”
He also pointed out that US film crews were not given the freedom to
edit their own packages and all their material had to be sent to Washington
for editing.
Aside from the gate
keeping that was going on back in London and Washington, there was also
a big difference in the way that US and UK troops treated the embedded
reporters.
Rob Bowles experienced
no censorship or restriction from the US military about what he could
or could not film and they informed him of all their military plans.
In fact he said the troops and leaders were extremely forthcoming and
would give his extensive and detailed information without even being
asked.
Geraint Vincent said
his experience was very different. He said the Paras and British military
were extremely paranoid about what was being sent back and regularly
intervened. He was also kept in the dark about what was happening and
where the unit would be heading next (appendix
2).
Both men described
a very different situation in Baghdad itself, where reporting restrictions
were placed on the reporters in the Palestine Hotel. They were only
allowed to broadcast pictures of the Presidential Compound. This was
not a reflection of life in Baghdad as both men said their experience
of the war in the city was fairly normal. The Presidential Palace was
the only area to be bombarded, while in residential areas life was going
on almost as normal and the houses were unscathed. However, Iraqi broadcasting
restrictions meant no pictures of the undamaged residential areas could
be shown.
Self-censorship also
took place as a result of rules imposed by the military. Several journalists
were sent home for disclosing too much information, while another was
sacked for conducting an interview with an Iraqi TV station (Tumber
& Pamer, 2004: 31). The ejection of journalists who inadvertently
broke the rules inevitably encouraged other reporters to remain well
within their guidelines and not to push the boundaries of their reporting
for fear of losing their jobs or being deported.
British reporters
were also subject to broadcasting decency rules which prevented them
from showing violent or graphic images so regularly censored themselves
to produce packages that would fall within these guidelines. As a result,
the media was accused of presenting a sanitised version of the war.
Despite being awarded unprecedented access to the front line, reporters
failed to show viewers the extent of the horror that they had witnessed.
Conclusion
The increased use of embedded reporters has added a new dimension to
war reporting, although their role, as with all other forms of journalism,
is affected by a variety of other influences.
It is difficult to
compare the effectiveness of embedded reporters with that of independent
journalists as embeds have not replaced the independent media; they
are a group of journalists who are present at the behest of the government
and military. However, the large scale employment of embeds has been
coupled with a concerted effort to discourage independent journalism.
This is a cause for concern.
The role of embeds
has meant there is very little reliance on pool journalists, which most
people agree, served a very limited function. In this sense, the move
towards embedded reporting can be seen as a positive one. However, the
pool still serves a function, where official briefings about the overview
of the war can provide valuable context to the reports received from
embeds on the battlefield.
The number of independent
reporters killed throughout the conflict was a cause of immense concern.
Many reporters risked their lives in an effort to maintain their impartiality
and while a disproportionate number of unilateral reporters were killed,
there were no reported casualties among embedded reporters. On the face
of it, this appears to indicate that embeds had a distinct advantage
as they had access to military information and the front line while
working in a comparatively low-risk situation.
However, claims that
the US military were reckless or, even worse, deliberately targeted
independent reporters call into question whether the military was actively
trying to discourage reporters from going it alone. If so, this surely
has implications for role of the media as a source of reliable and balanced
information for voters.
While embeds were
subject to the rules of their military units, they did have access to
the front line of the conflict as it unfolded. However, despite this
unprecedented level of access, reporters were still reliant on the troops
for their survival, which in turn compromised their ability to present
a balanced argument. Embeds were also unable to leave their units to
obtain independent accounts from Iraqi civilians or soldiers.
Embeds with British
units experienced high levels of secrecy and censorship, while US embeds
enjoyed unexpected freedom of information. Reporters in Baghdad also
operated under Iraqi broadcasting restrictions which prevented them
from showing civilian buildings.
After the conflict
had started, the shortage of new footage meant that the majority of
packages sent by reporters to the UK were broadcast in full; however,
journalists compiling the packages were aware of broadcasting and military
restrictions and filed their reports accordingly. Many admitted censoring
their packages to prevent them from being censored elsewhere at a later
stage.
Although embedding
with the military inevitably gives a one-sided view of the conflict,
there are also many benefits that cannot be found in other forms of
reporting. Providing reports from embedded journalists are used in a
balanced way alongside other sources, such reports are likely to raise
the level of understanding of the war situation. However, in the case
of the Iraq war, there was a tendency to rely too much on embedded reporters,
which made the overall understanding of the war very difficult.
•
Lewis, Justin, et al. (2004), Too Close for Comfort: The Role of Embedded
Reporting During the 2003 Iraq War, Cardiff University.
•
Lynch, Jake (2004) Reporting Iraq - What went right? What went wrong?
in Biressi, A. & Nunn, H. (eds.) (2004) Mediactive: Media War, London:
Barefoot